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Abstract:
When young and small organizations grow into medium-sized
organizations they often implement monetary incentive systems of which
the consequences are unclear. Whilst implemented to increase employee
(innovative) output and value creation, they have ambiguous effects and
may even reduce value creation. Due to the different effects that monetary
incentives have, this paper distinguishes reciprocal and opportunistic
employees’ different reactions to incentives. It analyses the effects of
decentralized incentive systems—and thus of incentive systems targeted
better at opportunistic vs. reciprocal employees—on value creation. Here
it proposes a causal feedback structure explaining opportunistic and
reciprocal employees’ different reactions and it investigates by simulation
how incentives and value creation interact over time. The analysis reveals
that behaviour is not pre-determined by employee disposition. It shows
how dynamics evolve dependent on the interrelationships of employee
dispositions and the organizational context. As such it exemplifies the
usefulness of studying dynamics of incentive systems and employee
behaviour.
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Introduction
In early phases after foundation, organizational hierarchy levels and the
distance between decision-maker(s) and employees are low as
organizations are usually still small. When these organizations grow to
medium-sized companies, however, the distance between organizational
members increases. At this stage, organizational leaders have become less
knowledgeable about their employees’ characteristics and preferences and
they start using incentive systems in order to manage employees and to
increase their innovative behaviour and value creation. Often, centralized
decision-makers in an organization that has grown to medium size can
only treat employees in the organization or in a department as a
homogeneous group, because they are unable to know about all
employees’ characteristics and preferences. However, this may be
disadvantageous as research on incentive systems has shown.
Research on incentive systems addresses the effects of incentives on
employee motivation (conceptual: Amabile, 1993; Bridoux, Coeurderoy
and Durand, 2011; empirical: Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange, 2011; Fang
and Gerhart, 2011). Findings suggest that monetary incentives may both
increase employee performance and value creation (Falk, 2002; Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Gächter and Falk, 2002) as well as decrease
motivation and performance because individuals loose self-determination
and shift the locus of control to the external (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Ryan
and Deci, 2000a). Thus, findings are contradictory. In these studies,
researchers often regard employees as a homogeneous group, while other
streams of research portray clear differences within groups of employees.
For the study of employee motivation, employee motives to cooperate are
of particular importance. Considering the heterogeneity of employee
motives, research in the behavioural economics tradition distinguishes
self-regarding or opportunistic employees from other-regarding or
reciprocal employees, called proselfs and prosocials in the psychology
literature (Bogaert, Boone and Declerck, 2008; Bridoux, Coeurderoy and
Durand, 2011; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978). These empirically grounded
categorizations constitute ends of a continuum of a motive to contribute to
a common good vs. oneself. Between 60 and 70 percent of people have
shown to expect and enforce reciprocation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
Research on social value orientation suggests that opportunistic people are
driven by external incentives whereas for reciprocal people relationship-
and value-oriented behaviour is more important (Bogaert, Boone and
Declerck, 2008). These people thus react differently to the same
incentives.
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However, centralized decision makers in a medium-sized organization
are no longer able to know the degree of reciprocity among sub-groups of
employees and cannot target incentive systems to them. They may assume
opportunistic people in sales and reciprocal people in research or human
resources. Whether and to what extent this is true and whether
inter-organizational differences exist remains unclear. Knowledge on
centralized vs. targeted-decentralized decisions is required here since
opposed reactions of opportunistic and reciprocal people have been
reported (e.g. Bogaert, Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 2012). Additionally,
studies report ambiguous effects of decentralization on motivation and
output (Sherman and Smith, 1984; Zoghi, Mohr and Meyer, 2010 vs. De
Paola and Scoppa, 2010; Walsh, 1993) and they do not account for
different reactions of reciprocal vs. opportunistic employees. Additionally,
these studies do not provide causal explanations (Zoghi, Mohr and Meyer,
2010).
Based on these contradictory findings, the purpose of this paper is to
explain the effects of decentralized decision-making regarding incentive
systems and value creation in organizations. This analysis offers an
organizational and behavioural perspective concentrating on monetary
incentives and their different effects on reciprocal and opportunistic
employees. It thus distinguishes between groups of employees who are
either more reciprocal, i.e. who reciprocate and pay back, or are more
opportunistic, i.e. rational and selfish. This paper focuses on the inner-
organizational perspective and helps make sense of existing contradictory
findings in particular from behavioural economics and psychology. It
addresses motivation effects (e.g. Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange, 2011) at
the exclusion of sorting and other effects (e.g. Bandiera, Barankay and
Rasul, 2013; Guertzgen, 2009; Lazear, 1986; Lazear, 2000) as it aims at a
deeper understanding of the dynamics between incentives and motivation.
Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange (2011: 608) call for research on people’s
reaction to incentives over time. They argue that it remains unclear how
group norms affect the evolution of repeated games. This paper not only
investigates repeated snapshots, but provides a continuous perspective of
incentive dynamics. Taking a causal perspective, it will explain emerging
dynamics by the interplay of feedback mechanisms by reference to a
generic structural archetype called Fixes that Fail (Senge, 1994: 388–389).
This analogy provides useful because the archetype reveals the structure of
ineffective actions to researchers and organizations. It captures
goal-seeking and reinforcing feedback of how decentralization helps an
organization not to get stuck with an ineffective incentive system, but to
incite its people to be innovative and create value for the organization.
In the following section the literature on incentive systems,
decentralization, and reciprocity will be reviewed as it relates to
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decision-making in organizations. Afterwards, the system dynamics
method will be explained and a system dynamics model will be presented
which will then be used to understand the dynamics of incentive systems
and value creation in organizations. The model will be analysed. It
explains by combining causal structure and dynamic behaviour how
incentive systems affect employee innovative behaviour and how
decentralization helps target an incentive system to employees.
Research on Incentives, Reciprocity, and Decentralization
Research in the areas behavioural economics and psychology investigates
the effect of incentives on the effort and performance of employees or
people in general. Research on the effect of decentralization on employee
performance is rather established in management, labour economics, and
public administration. The findings relevant for our analysis from these
two streams of literature will be portrayed.
Incentive and Reciprocity Research
In behavioural economics and psychology, studies on incentives are often
conducted in an experimental setting. While rational explanations for a
positive effect of incentives on productivity exist (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989),
reality portrays complex relationships. Empirical research found that
monetary incentives which people receive increase their work effort
(Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange, 2011; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993;
Heyman and Ariely, 2004). However, it has also become clear that reality
is less simple. People’s effort correlates with the amount of fix wages that
have been paid even before people needed to put in effort (Falk, 2002;
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Gächter and Falk, 2002). Forsythe et
al. (1994) also found that people’s perception of fairness greatly affects
how they behave. This means they reciprocate the behaviour or the
intention they see in the other party (Gouldner, 1960). They even
anticipate reciprocation: e.g. in experiments employers offer higher wages
in anticipation of resulting high employee effort (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and
Riedl, 1993). Hence, employers expect that employees behave reciprocally
and employees reciprocate indeed. Additionally, a long-term relationship
supports reciprocation due to building trust between the involved parties
(Gächter and Falk, 2002, for trust also see Malhotra, 2004; Williamson,
1993).
However, monetary incentives do not always have the desired effects
(Prendergast, 1999). Contradictory to the fact that employees reciprocate
wages by effort, researchers argued (Amabile, 1993; Ryan and Deci,
Name
2000a) and showed (Falk, 2002; Weibel, Rost and Osterloh, 2010; for
overviews see Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey and Osterloh, 2001) that
monetary incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation of employees. The
decrease in motivation and performance has been explained by
individuals’ loss of self-determination and shift of control to the external
due to losses of competence, autonomy, and relatedness (Ryan and Deci,
2000b, for meta-analytic evidence see Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999).
Monetary incentives, i.e. extrinsic motivators, reduce effort because they
negatively affect intrinsic motivation (Weibel, Rost and Osterloh, 2010).
Here, people avoid being instrumentalized by incentives and therefore
reject incentive systems that build on high monetary extrinsic rewards. At
the same time, Fang and Gerhard (2011) do not find negative effects of
pay for performance on intrinsic motivation, and results for the quality and
quantity of results differ (Jenkins Jr et al., 1998). Thus, the relationship
between incentives and employee output is complex and research methods
should capture this complexity.
Effects of Decentralization
Studies focusing on incentive systems, performance, and reciprocity have
not yet considered the effects of decentralization. Decentralization
includes a more organic form of control, more local decision making, but
also employees’ ability to choose appropriate incentives through flexible
benefit plans (Barringer and Milkovich, 1998), representing a form of
strong decentralization. More often, researchers analyse how decentralized
incentive systems affect coordination and performance of networks
between organizations instead of focusing on the inner-organizational
level. E.g. it has been shown that decentralized setting of union wages
positively affects innovation (Haucap and Wey, 2004). In the area of
horizontal and vertical collaboration among supply chain members,
however, decentralization has negative effects. When members of a supply
chain set individual incentives, the entire supply chain may be less
efficient as it is less aligned along incentives and goals (Lee and Whang,
1999). Additionally, decentralized collaborations are less beneficial than
centralized ones when the partners are different (Oswald, 2010).
At the inner-organizational level, the alignment problem exists as well.
Researchers argue that decentralized decision-making and delegation—i.e.
a form of decentralization—have negative consequences due to
information asymmetries between the principal and its agents (De Paola
and Scoppa, 2010) as well as due to bargaining costs (Walsh, 1993). Quite
contrary, a study by Sherman and Smith (1984) suggests and one by
Zoghi, Mohr and Meyer (2010) finds a positive relationship between
decentralization and innovation. As found through a meta-analysis,
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incentives are more effective when managed decentrally by close peers
rather than far authorities (Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange, 2011). These
findings indicate that a reliable relationship between decentralization and
value creation has not been found.
Hence, existing research rather addresses the effects of employees’
decentralized decision-making on organizational innovative behaviour and
outcomes. It does not focus on the fit or appropriateness of a
(de-)centralized incentive system to employee reciprocity. Reverting to
findings in the areas of organizational psychology and behavioural
economics, Bridoux et al. (2011) argue how a misfit between incentive
systems and employee characteristics can diminish value creation. This
also indicates that a corporate environment which supports or contradicts
inherent employee characteristics may influence employee behaviour
positively as well as negatively. As these findings are still in a conceptual
stage and as studies often analyse by experiments how to incite
cooperative behaviour, they produce sequential snapshots of human
behaviour. Additionally, in empirical studies on the relationship between
decentralization and incentives “the direction of causality, if any, is
unclear.” (Zoghi, Mohr and Meyer, 2010, p. 638) In the following section,
this paper therefore explains by a feedback perspective the causal
relationships between employee behaviour and incentives in centralized
and decentralized organizations. Through simulation it is able to show
continuously how an organization’s motivational system and employee
behaviour evolve over time.
A System Dynamics Model of Monetary Incentives,
Decentralization, and Value Creation
System Dynamics Modelling
This paper uses system dynamics to model the relationship between the
organization and its employees’ behaviour. System dynamics is a method
that uses computer simulation to understand complex phenomena that
involve accumulations, delays, nonlinear effects and feedback
relationships (Forrester, 1961; Forrester, 1994; Richardson, 1991). This
makes it an especially useful method for analysing multicollinear settings,
mediation, and circular causality. System dynamics uses formal modelling
for a rigorous understanding of system structure and behaviour to aid
decision-making (Milling, 1984). It is a structural theory of social systems
(Größler, Thun and Milling, 2008; Lane, 1999; Milling, 1984) and thus a
systems method. It has been used for various applications starting from the
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Club of Rome’s limits to growth issue (Forrester, 1971) to project
management (Black and Repenning, 2001) and subsequent litigation as
well as managerial decision-making (Rahmandad, 2012; Zimmermann,
2011). Investigating the effects of incentives has a long tradition in system
dynamics. Because of the method’s usefulness to understand delays and
counterintuitive effects, in particular different effects for following
long-term goals vs. short-time incentives have been evaluated. For
example, Black and Repenning (2001) investigated adequate vs.
under-allocation of resources in companies, and Rahmandad (2012)
examined the preference for investing in short-term operational
capabilities vs. long-term growth opportunities. This paper presents a
model of the allocation of resources to monetary incentives and effects of
decentralization on this allocation.
A Model of Monetary Incentives, Decentralization, and Value Creation
The system dynamics model described in this chapter relates to incentives,
value creation and decentralization. First, it captures the effects of
incentives on employees (e.g. Falk, 2002; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl,
1993; Gächter and Falk, 2002). Here it makes use of a model focused on
incentives and output only Zimmermann, 2014). Second, it closes the
feedback view by including the organization’s reaction on its employees‘
behaviour. Third and most importantly, it encompasses the effects of
decentralization on how the relationship between output and incentives
operates.
There are four feedback loops which are most influential for the
model’s behaviour, of whom the first two (right part of Figure 1) will be
presented now and the third one several paragraphs later. The two
feedback loops shown in the right part of Figure 1) describe goal-seeking
mechanisms by which the organization adapts its incentive system as long
as the goal desired value creation has not been achieved. When it
perceived a gap, it increases monetary incentives per employee, which
increase output per opportunistic and reciprocal employee as well as
average output per employee, closing the gap. The picture of a scale in the
middle of the loops indicates their balancing or goal-seeking character.
The left part of Figure 1 presents this mechanism in a conceptual manner,
whereas the right part of Figure 1 describes it in more detail related to the
topic of incentives, value creation, and decentralization.
When organizational decision-makers perceive a problem, e.g. a gap
between average and desired value creation per employee they try to fix
it, here with higher monetary incentives (Clark and Wilson, 1961: 129). Of
course, this is based on the assumption that the average value creation per
employee can be known. Monetary incentives per employee increase with
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a time delay—like a stock that takes time to fill and each month some
proportion of the gap is closed. The time delay is considered to be six
month, representing a possible bi-annual revision of the incentive system.
Following the literature, the model disaggregates and distinguishes
between opportunistic and reciprocal employees who react on incentives
(e.g. Falk, 2002; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Gächter and Falk,
2002; Peterson and Luthans, 2006 vs. Frey and Jegen, 2001; Ryan and
Deci, 2000a; see also Bridoux, Coeurderoy and Durand, 2011).
Opportunistic employees increase their output with rising monetary
incentives. This is captured by a linearly increasing effect of incentives on
the output of opportunistic employees (Bridoux, Coeurderoy and Durand,
2011), representing employees’ monetary interest, and by a less steep
increase for higher incentives up to a maximum where opportunistic
employees cannot increase their output any more. Line A in Figure 3
shows this relationship. It indicates how monetary incentives per employee
affect the output per opportunistic employee, shown in Figure 1.
Reciprocal employees also increase their output with rising fix incentives
(see line B of Figure 3, effect of fix incentives on output of reciprocal
employees) as they reciprocate their employer’s appraisal through higher
effort (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). Up
to a threshold where the nature of the incentive system becomes too
monetary, their reciprocal nature as team players even makes them more
productive than opportunistic employees. Economic studies (Bandiera,
Barankay and Rasul, 2013; Lazear, 2000; for an overview see Gerhart,
Rynes and Fulmer, 2009) investigating these settings empirically support
these findings, but also hint to sorting effects which this analysis excludes
to be able to understand ceteri paribus effects of motivation. Overall,
higher (innovative) effort increases the organization’s value creation and
thus closes the gap between the desired and actual value. The
organization’s decision on monetary incentives thus works like a fix to the
problem of insufficient output and value creation.
However, concerning reciprocal employees this only represents one of
two important mechanisms. Additionally, a reinforcing mechanism is
active, shown in Figure 2, which renders monetary incentives a fix that
fails with reciprocal employees. While their effort and output increases
with fix incentives, high monetary rewards decrease their effort as they
destroy their intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000a). Reciprocal
people regard an incentive system highly focused on variable pay as an
affront against their motivation. Empirical research supports that effort
decreases when monetary incentives rise above a threshold (Falk, 2002;
Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey and Osterloh, 2001). In the model this
threshold is set to 5000 Euros, representing possible costs of the employee
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to the employer. Monetary incentives below this value represent fix
incentives that increase reciprocal employees’ output, whereas incentives
above this value represent variable incentives that decrease their output.
Line C in Figure 3 shows the latter relationship by the effect of variable
incentives on output of reciprocal employees. The inverse gradients of
lines A and B vs. line C in Figure 3 explain why the feedback loops
Inciting 1 and 2 in Figure 2 are balancing while Inciting 3 is a reinforcing
feedback loop. Once above the threshold, reciprocal employees do not feel
valued any more, their performance decreases because of this misfit, but
the organization continues to react to this performance shortfall by
increasing incentives. The three effects represented by the three lines in
Figure 3 distinguish employees who desire high monetary incentives from
those whose motivation is crowded out by a too monetary focus. The
model structure that combines balancing with reinforcing effects
corresponds to the Fixes that Fail Archetype that explains structurally how
people bet on the wrong horse (Senge, 1994: 388–389). It elucidates how
people, attempting to close a gap in what they consider a balancing
structure, actually worsen the gap because they fail to acknowledge the
underlying reinforcing nature of that structure.
Decentralization has been modelled to represent organizational
decision-makers’ knowledge of their employees’ preferences and how this
knowledge allows them to target the incentive system to their employees’
either more opportunistic or reciprocal characteristics. While these
decision-makers cannot affect how an employee reacts to a given incentive
system, they shape how the organization reacts on a value creation gap
and designs the incentive system. I.e. decentralization targets the link
between the gap and the monetary incentives per employee, indicated by
the thicker line inFigure 4 which is affected by a further feedback loop
indicating the changing weight on monetary incentives that decision
makers attribute. This weight depends on the current state of the incentive
system, on employee preferences (i.e. the fraction of reciprocal
employees), and on decision makers’ knowledge of this composition
indicating on how closely individual decisions are targeted to employees
(degree of decentralization). This allows adapting the sub-groups
motivational system to employee preferences.
This model has been tested in particular for its internal consistency. It
shows reasonable behaviour in all of these tests, e.g. concerning its
dimensions, boundary, and extreme conditions (e.g. Forrester and Senge,
1980).
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Results: Dynamic Effects of Decentralization
Simulation analyses of the model portray equilibrium conditions first
(Figure 5) before turning to sensitivity results (Figure 6). As Figure 5
shows, there is an equilibrium point whenever the organization is torn
between increasing and decreasing incentives, when it is e.g. fully
decentralized and aware of an equal distribution of reciprocal and
opportunistic employees. In equilibrium, neither do employees change
their work effort nor does the organization adapt its incentive system. The
sensitivity analyses portray conditions apart from equilibrium. They reveal
that in particular for organizations having very reciprocal sub-groups, it is
important to adapt these groups’ motivational systems to employee
preferences. Figure 6 demonstrates this by comparing value creation for
reciprocal (left graphs) and opportunistic (right graphs) employees in their
reaction to high (upper graphs) and low (bottom graphs) initial incentives.
Importantly, the graphs do not represent constant monetary incentives, but
show how value creation evolves over time dependent on changing
incentives. Figure 6 demonstrates how average value creation per
employee evolves from month 0 to 120 dependent on degrees of
decentralization of 0 to 1 in the organization.
The left two graphs of Figure 6 reveal that in an organization with
(70 percent) reciprocal employees a higher degree of decentralization
leads to higher value creation. Independent of whether the organization
starts out at low or high monetary incentives, over time, decentralized
decision-makers adapt the system to employee preferences and thus
achieve high value creation. A centralized decision-maker cannot equally
adapt to employees’ preferences. Value creation in a centralized
organization reaches a lower level due to an incentive system focused too
much on variable pay that becomes increasingly inappropriate for the
majority of employees.
Figure 7 exemplifies the possible misfit for an organization with a
centralized decision-maker and rather reciprocal employees. As monetary
incentives (line 1) start out low, average value creation (line 2) is below
the desired value of 10000 Euros. The organization responds by increasing
incentives (line 1). This raises the output per reciprocal employee (line 4)
to the desired level. However, the organization continues to increase
incentives as the output per opportunistic employee (line 3) and thus
average value creation are still below 10000 Euros. While the minority of
opportunistic employees become increasingly satisfied and work better,
the reciprocal employees’ motivation is crowded out and their output
diminishes (line 4).
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When employees are rather opportunistic (i.e. 30 percent reciprocal
employees), decentralized decision-makers recognize their preferences
and create a highly monetary incentive system that fits their preferences.
Centralized decision-makers are also assumed to compensate low
performance by high monetary incentives. In both cases value creation is
rather high as shown in the two right graphs of Figure 6. Thus, when the
organization’s response corresponds to employee preferences—by chance
or knowledge—value creation is adequate. Overall, in a decentralized
organization there is better knowledge of how the sub-groups’
motivational systems can be adapted to the situation. Dependent on the
employees’ characteristics, a centralized system, however, may freeze in a
situation inefficient for the organization and undesired by the employees.
Discussion and Conclusion
Dynamic Understanding of Interactions
This paper explains the effects of decentralized decision-making regarding
incentive systems and value creation in organizations. It combines
research on incentives and rewards with that on reciprocity. Usually,
researchers distinguish extrinsic and intrinsic motivation with respect to
incentive systems, and it is established knowledge that extrinsic rewards
may crowd out intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1993; Falk, 2002; Frey and
Jegen, 2001; Ryan and Deci, 2000a; Weibel, Rost and Osterloh, 2010). By
including recent research on reciprocity and value creation (Bridoux,
Coeurderoy and Durand, 2011), this work is able not only to distinguish
different effects of monetary incentives per se, but captures and explains
how reciprocal vs. opportunistic employees react differently on these
incentives. It does so by combination of a causal structure and resulting
dynamics. The causal structure portrays a causal model of employees’
reactions to incentive systems and enriches this perspective by including
the organizational response to employee behaviour as well. This creates a
feedback perspective that allows simulating the dynamic interaction of
these two parties over time.
This analysis elucidates by correspondence to the Fixes that Fail
Archetype (Senge, 1994), which explains how decision makers try
improving a system while neglecting detrimental side effects of their
improvements, why monetary incentives may have counterintuitive results
among employees. As the distance between the upper decision-making
body and regular employees increases in a growing organization,
decision-makers often react by implementing incentive systems. This is
based on the assumption of a goal-seeking feedback structure, i.e. on the
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assumption that incentives increase employees’ innovative performance
and in particular that using incentives brings the organization closer to its
desired value creation. By correspondence to the Fixes that Fail Archetype
it could be shown that this is correct for opportunistic employees, but only
partially correct for reciprocal employees. As findings in particular from
experimental economics (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993) and
psychology (Heyman and Ariely, 2004) indicate, reciprocal employees
react positively on fixed incentives, creating the desired goal-seeking
mechanism, but they react negatively on “too” monetary incentives (Falk,
2002; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey and Osterloh, 2001), creating a
reinforcing mechanism by which incentives are driven upwards but value
creation downwards. This structure explains why in some cases incentives
work and why they do not achieve the desired results in other situations.
The fraction of reciprocal employees determines which of the balancing
and reinforcing feedback loops are particularly important. Knowledge of
this structures helps making better decisions and decentralization means
better knowledge of this causal structure. This is why there is a much
better fit between employee disposition and the incentive system in
organizations that have reciprocal employees and are decentralized at the
same time. Due to these organizations’ knowledge of how incentives fall
flat with certain groups of employees, decentralized decision-makers are
less likely to trap into fixes that fail.
By combining causal structure with dynamic behaviour, this analysis
reveals not only that but how incentive systems and employee behaviour
converge or diverge over time. It helps distinguish patterns of behaviour
and different equilibria that are reached by different strategies (i.e.
combinations of employee reciprocity and organizational
decentralization). Linking behaviour back to a causal structure, i.e. back to
goal-seeking and reinforcing mechanisms in the Fixes that Fail Archetype
as done above explains the different patterns of behaviour seen.
Sensitivity analyses that vary the degree or decentralization in the
organization tell that employee reactions differ depending on
organizational decisions. This reveals how the dynamics in these cases are
not only dependent on a fixed employee disposition, but that they differ in
the course of time. Revealing this was only possible because of the
two-sided causal structure that includes the employees’ reaction to
incentives systems and the organization’s modification of its incentive
system. Other studies often have a psychological foundation and focus on
employee characteristics, or they have an economic foundation with a
focus on game theory and experiments. They are thus able to show
employees favorable or unfavorable reaction to an incentive system and
their decision whether to cooperate. However, this analysis adds a
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dynamic perspective, showing how the behavior of an entire group of
employees can evolve over time, instead on focusing on an employee’s
disposition or one-time decision. Overall, it can be concluded that the
evolving behaviour is determined dynamically by the employees’ general
disposition and by transitory situational factors of the evolution of
system-preferences fit, giving room for managing employee behaviour in
an organization.
For managerial decision-makers this analysis thus provides better
understanding of the fit between managerial decisions and employee
behaviour and thus of the consequences of their decisions. It creates a
basis for setting incentives for innovative behaviour differently not only
across departments as they may exist in larger organizations, e.g. by
inciting sales people differently from people in research and development.
Instead, it reveals that it may be useful to have even work groups or
smaller groups in general, as they also exist in young or smaller
organizations, decide on the incentive system they want to follow. By
linkage to the underlying causal structure it gives rise into the
counterintuitive effects of the implementation or monetization of incentive
systems. In this way this analysis aids recognising how different groups of
employees can be targeted to achieve high value creation in each of the
groups.
Contributions, Limitations and Future Research
While there is a tendency to put in place monetary incentive systems in an
organization that grows from a young and small to a middle-sized
organization, this does not hold true for every organization. There exist
exemptions that may focus on e.g. fix pay only. In these organizations
results would inverse: While decentralization would be particularly
valuable when the majority of employees are rather opportunistic, it would
still hold that decentralization helps recognize employee preferences and
helps adapt the incentive systems.
This inquiry builds on the fact that decentralized decision-makers have
a better understanding of their instructed persons than a centralized
organizational entity can have. Benefits that arise from this better
understanding are limited by the side-effects of decentralized incentive
systems. E.g. Weibel, Rost and Osterloh (2010) argue based on a meta-
analytic study of the public sector that pay for performance produces
hidden costs, which this analysis does not account for in great detail.
While the system dynamics model captures the idea that organizational
decision-makers are less willing to increase monetary incentives if these
are high, future research should capture hidden costs to provide a more
nuanced understanding.
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In general, not all (interacting) phenomena are captured here. This
study addresses motivation effects (e.g. Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange,
2011) at the exclusion of differences between positive and negative
reciprocity (Pereira, Silva and Silva, 2006) as well as at the exclusion of
sorting effects (e.g. Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2013; Guertzgen,
2009; Lazear, 1986; Lazear, 2000) as it aims at a deeper understanding of
the dynamics between incentives and motivation. An analysis of the
development of interactions over time cannot portray the interaction of all
variables as this is incomparably more complex. Dynamics first need to be
understood ceteris paribus before in future research they can be integrated
with effects from literatures on sorting (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul,
2013; Guertzgen, 2009; Lazear, 1986; Lazear, 2000), trust (Bogaert,
Boone and Declerck, 2008; Malhotra, 2004), or peer sanctioning (Bridoux,
Coeurderoy and Durand, 2011; ).
Additionally, the feedback mechanisms provide a basis for
investigating implementation of incentive systems. This may include
implementation delays and costs in a more nuanced manner. The model
captures costs indirectly by the organization’s diminishing willingness to
increase incentives when incentives rise. Future research may also capture
delays between real and perceived value creation, different delays for
increasing vs. decreasing incentives, and in particular it may investigate
the effect of decentralization on the length of these delays.
The simulation analysis conducted here at the organizational and
group level, in combination with existing studies (Deci, Koestner and
Ryan, 1999; Gerhart, Rynes and Fulmer, 2009; Lazear, 2000), provides a
sound basis for empirical investigation. This might include the observed
fit between employee disposition and incentive system dependent on
specific forms of monetary and non-monetary reward systems. It might
also embrace the analysis of incentive systems considering organizational
size and age (Shaw, Gupta and Delery, 2002) as well as dynamics as
young organizations mature and grow. Based on the dynamics presented
here for sub-groups of employees, performance-relevant within-group
differences concerning could also be investigated at the individual level.
In its current state, this paper already offers a dynamic understanding of
the relationship between incentives, employee innovative performance,
and decentralization which is needed when organizations grow and
incentive systems are implemented. The resulting knowledge on
decentralized motivational systems can be used not only to incite output in
general, but also to put in place adequate motivational systems for the
generation of new ideas, innovative firm behaviour (Zoghi, Mohr and
Meyer, 2010) and organizational change.
Name
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Figure 6 Model behaviour
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Figure 7 Incentives and output
Name
Appendix
average value creation per employee = output per reciprocal employee *
FRACTION OF RECIPROCAL EMPLOYEES + output per
opportunistic employee * (1 - FRACTION OF RECIPROCAL
EMPLOYEES)
Units: €/employee
Sum of group outputs. Here the model is based on the assumption that the
average output per employee is known.
change in incentives = gap in value creation * weight on monetary
incentives * effect of margin on incentives / TIME TO CHANGE
INCENTIVES
Units: €/employee/Month
Decisions made concerning the incentive system.
DEGREE OF DECENTRALIZATION = 1
Units: Dmnl
Extent to which decisions on the incentive system are made decentrally
instead of centrally.
DESIRED AVERAGE VALUE CREATION PER EMPLOYEE = 10000
Units: €/employee
The organization's performance goal.
effect of fix incentives on output of reciprocal employees = WITH
LOOKUP (relative incentives, ([(0,0)-
(2,1)],(0,0),(0.5,0.7),(0.6,0.8),(0.7,0.88),(0.8,0.94),(0.9,0.98),(1,1),(2,
1) ))
Units: Dmnl
Effect capturing how reciprocal employees increase their output with
decreasing intensity up to a threshold as a response to rising fix
monetary incentives.
effect of incentives on output of opportunistic employees = WITH
LOOKUP (relative incentives, ([(0,0)-(2,2)],(0,0),(1,0.8),(2,1.1) ))
Units: Dmnl
Opportunistic employees increase their output almost linearly with rising
monetary incentives. This is captured be a linear increase (Bridoux,
Coeurderoy and Durand, 2011), representing their monetary interest,
and by a less steep increase for higher incentives up to a maximum
where opportunistic employees cannot increase their output any more.
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effect of variable incentives on output of reciprocal employees = WITH
LOOKUP (relative incentives, ([(0,0.4)-
(2,1)],(0,1),(1,1),(1.1,0.98),(1.2,0.9),(1.4,0.7),(1.6,0.55),(1.8,0.51),(2,
0.5) ))
Units: Dmnl
Effect showing how displaced reciprocal employees feel in a strongly
monetary incentive system. Reciprocal employees often regard the
implicit message that work needs to be incited as an affront to their
willingness to perform so that their intrinsic motivation is crowded
out (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Frey & Osterloh, 2001).
effect of margin on incentives = (DESIRED AVERAGE VALUE
CREATION PER EMPLOYEE - Monetary Incentives per Employee)
/ DESIRED AVERAGE VALUE CREATION PER EMPLOYEE
Units: Dmnl
This effects slows down inciting when incentives approach desired output,
i.e. when the margin between incentives and output declines.
FINAL TIME = 120
Units: Month
The final time for the simulation.
FRACTION OF RECIPROCAL EMPLOYEES = 0.5
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of employees who reciprocate rather than being self-regarding.
gap in value creation = DESIRED AVERAGE VALUE CREATION PER
EMPLOYEE - average value creation per employee
Units: Dmnl
Gap between output and performance goal.
INI MONETARY INCENTIVES = 5000
Units: €/employee
Amount of incentives offered at start of simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 0
Units: Month
The initial time for the simulation.
Monetary Incentives per Employee = INTEG (change in incentives, INI
MONETARY INCENTIVES)
Name
Units: €/employee
Amount of incentives offered per employee. It may include fix and
variable pay offerings.
NORMAL INCENTIVES PER EMPLOYEE = 5000
Units: €/employee
Height of incentives that is considered normal by the employees. It may
differ depending on the organization, region, industry, ...
NORMAL OUTPUT = 10000
Units: €/employee
Output that employees can generate.
output per opportunistic employee = NORMAL OUTPUT * effect of
incentives on output of opportunistic employees
Units: €/employee
Output generated per opportunistic employee. This value of this variable is
unknown to the organization.
output per reciprocal employee = NORMAL OUTPUT * effect of fix
incentives on output of reciprocal employees * effect of variable
incentives on output of reciprocal employees
Units: €/employee
Output generated per reciprocal employee. This value of this variable is
unknown to the organization.
perceived fairness of incentives = WITH LOOKUP (relative incentives,
([(0,0)-
(2,1)],(0,0),(0.5,0.05),(0.7,0.12),(0.8,0.2),(0.9,0.4),(0.95,0.6),(1,1),(2,
1) ))
Units: Dmnl
Extent to which employees regard incentives as monetary fair. This
variable indicates how far the payment is below the threshold when
employees start considering the payment as fair.
relative incentives = Monetary Incentives per Employee / NORMAL
INCENTIVES PER EMPLOYEE
Units: Dmnl
Height of incentives in comparison to what is considered normal e.g. in a
particular organization, region, industry, ...
SAVEPER = 1
Units: Month [0,?]
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The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 0.125
Units: Month [0,?]
The time step for the simulation.
TIME TO CHANGE INCENTIVES = 6
Units: Month
Adaptation time including decision and implementation.
weight on monetary incentives = 1 - 2 * DEGREE OF
DECENTRALIZATION * FRACTION OF RECIPROCAL
EMPLOYEES * perceived fairness of incentives
Units: Dmnl
The decision makers' inclination to react by increasing incentives. This
variable can have values in the interval [-1, 1] and determines whether
and how strongly decision makers react to a gap by increasing or
decreasing monetary incentives, also depending on the degree of
decentralization and the fraction of reciprocal employees. Depending
on degrees of reciprocity and decentralization, there are instances
when the system remains in equilibrium because the tendencies to
increase and decrease incentives have equal size.
